This is an inquiry into the economic psychology of trust: that is, what model of the political economy of complex liberal democracies is conducive to attitudes that allow difference to be perceived in the terms of 'significant other', rather than as a menacing or an irrelevant stranger. As a test case of prevailing perceptions of otherness in European societies, I examine attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the European Union.
enabling psychological attitudes within which otherness is perceived positively, in the terms of 'significant other'? Why would we want to bring political economy into the discussion of diversity? Because a facile multiculturalism that ignores the socioeconomic dynamics that generates a collective psychology of openness and inclusion is bound to fail in its ambition: cosmopolitanism is untenable without a political economy of trust.
To advance this argument, I will examine recent attitudes among European Union citizens towards Turkey's accession to the EU. Attitudes to Turkey's prospective EU membership supply relevant evidence for analyzing the conditions of effective diversity for two reasons. First, attitudes to EU enlargement are a good proxy for attitudes to otherness because acceptance of a new member-state necessitates not merely a neutral attitude towards the other (the new member) but an unambiguously positive one: the other should be seen as a 'significant' other. Accession of a new country to the EU is quite like a marriage: after a period of courtship (i.e. the application for EU membership and subsequent negotiations), the two sets of countries (old and new members) begin building a common life. From this angle, the underlying question is: What do the registered public attitudes toward Turkey's accession to the EU tell us about the terms in whicho t h e r n e s si sc u r r e n t l yp e r c e i v e di n Europe?
Second, the process of EU enlargement over the past decade has brought to light the relations among political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions of building a cosmopolitan, diverse community. The most recent round of EU enlargement (the accession of the former communist countries of eastern and central Europe) proved that empathy and good intentions for inclusion are insufficient drivers of effective diversity. The infatuation with the possibility to stabilize democratic reforms after the fall of communism by including the new democracies in the EU had masked the fact that these countries were mere strangers, and not significant others, to the old EU member-states. The difficulties that ensued -rising corruption in some of the new member-states, the abuse of EU funds, or the deterioration of labor-market standards in the old member-states due to competition from eastern Europe -have now shed light on socio-economic dimensions of political belonging that had been overlooked. To take up the marriage metaphor, the post-enlargement troubles were a lamentable confirmation of Oscar Wilde's dictum that in courtship people lose their heads, in marriage they discover the loss. My point is that the sensitivity towards noncultural and non-institutional parameters of inclusive diversity that the latest experience with EU enlargement has freshly brought about prompts a rethinking of the conditions for a cosmopolitan society, of which the EU is often seen as a blueprint. From this perspective, the leading question in examining Turkey's accession to the EU is: What are the conditions under which Turkey could be embraced by EU citizens in the terms of a significant other -a life partner?
Iwillproceedasfollows.First,afteroutliningaframeworkofanalysis,Iwillarticulate the parameters within which otherness tends to be perceived currently in Europe, drawing on evidence from the first EU-wide deliberative polls held in 2007. In the second part of the article, I will address the socio-political dynamics that underpin current changes in attitudes to diversity and difference.
1 The EU deliberative poll: a microcosm of the EU's public sphere
In order to capture the current socio-cultural climate in Europe I now turn to the deliberative polls that were held at the European Parliament in October 2007. At that time, a random sample of 362 citizens from all 27 EU member-states spent a weekend at the European Parliament building in Brussels. 1 Giving us a glimpse of the deliberative polls at work, the media at that time presented them as a process of 'getting the London cab driver to talk to the Marseilles dockworker' 2 on two sets of issues: (1) social and economic policy in the EU; (2) EU external relations, including EU enlargement. In my analysis here I will focus on attitudes towards enlargement, especially concerning Turkey's accession to the EU.
Before I proceed with the analysis, let me validate my choice of empirical evidence. Why do I prefer to look at these deliberative polls, rather than at standard public opinion surveys (for instance, Eurobarometer polls)? On the one hand, standard public opinion surveys are only snapshots of opinions, which are likely to reflect a temporary mood linked to parochial concerns; thus they are unsuitable to the particular goals of conceptualizing and analyzing more general societal attitudes to otherness. On the other hand, due to its particular design, deliberative polling avoids some of the typical shortfalls of sterile laboratory experiments in deliberative democracy.
3 This is mostly due to the fact that, as participants are selected by random sampling, and the selected cohort is sufficiently large, the group is representative of the larger community, thus avoiding what Cass Sunstein has criticized as 'group polarization' (the deepened radicalization of opinions participants already hold). 4 This supplies two reasons for relying on deliberative polling. First, due to measures facilitating the formation of informed opinion, such as provision of balanced information to participants, and the possibility they are given for consulting with experts holding different positions, we may take the deliberative polls to be representative of the European public sphere at its best (that is, a public sphere in which issues of governance are discussed on the basis of arguments informed by a wide range of evidence). Second, the changes of opinion registered at these polls can be taken to represent tendencies now at work in European societies, as public deliberations, especially when conducted according to the deliberative polls technology, give a communicative expression of existing social conflicts, thereby bringing to the fore latent tendencies that cannot be captured in standard opinion polls. 5 In this way, the process of deliberative polling captures wider societal dynamics of opinion-formation than what is achieved by taking the temperature of a public's mood as both standard opinion surveys and the typical experiments in deliberative policy-making tend to do.
Let me clarify this last point in order to shed light on the status I attribute to public deliberations in socio-political analysis more generally. Considered as a social practice (rather than as ideal conditions for testing the legitimacy of claims in a counterfactual manner), deliberations are not isolated from the rest of the social practices through which individuals interact, and in which they are socialized within specific contexts. What deliberations initially do is to enable participants to bring in a variety of reference points they have acquired in their personal contexts of socialization. In the course of mutual argumentation, the diversity of reference points that individual participants introduce comes to form a structured field of references (a structured public reason) in the following way. In the process of discussions, reference points start to relate among themselves through connections that give them particular signification. For instance, the European Union, as a reference point, might be articulated in relation to national sovereignty, to European states, to the United States, to religion (the issue of Christian spiritual outlook), to economic affluence, to the 'European social model', etc. All these are available references, but they are not equally relevant to the debate on enlargement, as we shall see. Shared perceptions are thus formed concerning which issues are salient ones. In other words, the formulation of conflicting positions (e.g. 'enlargement is beneficial/detrimental to multiculturalism') is both constrained and enabled by basic overlapping agreement on what issues count (are visible) as politically significant ones -salient issues of governance around which normative debate and political contestation take place. 6 These first articulations of visibility are not a matter of factual knowledge (e.g. the EU is in Europe), nor do they have an evaluative function (e.g. implying that Christianity is superior to Islam); they simply orient judgment by way of drawing distinctions, by discernment of what, among the vast sea of knowledge participants together possess, stands out to claim attention. This process of drawing distinctions and establishing linkages among reference points consequently leads to the formation of what I have described as a framework of articulation and signification shared by participants irrespectively of any moral disagreement they might have; it even enables the communicative expression of that disagreement.
7 While a quantitative analysis of opinion polls indicates what normative positions people hold (e.g. for or against enlargement), only a qualitative analysis of deliberations can indicate how opinion is structured:whattheissuesinrelation to which a normative disagreement acquires meaning are, what cognitive connections are drawn (e.g. whether enlargement is perceived in relation to cultural diversity or in relation to economic insecurity) in the formation of opinion. In this way, public deliberations may alter the parameters of the debate on governance (concerning both the justice and the expediency of particular policy) by way of giving political relevance to previously unquestioned social practices. For instance, they might establish a link between immigration and job insecurity (as we see now often in political discourse), a link that had not been present earlier. Demands for job security would then entail demands for closed borders.
Europe's new discursive landscape
Let us now examine, within the framework of analysis outlined above, the public deliberations as they took place at the European Parliament building during that October weekend in 2007. A quantitative analysis of the data shows that, after deliberations, participants decreased their support for enlargement, 8 while they increased their support for neo-liberal economic reforms 9 and increased their self-identification as Europeans (see Table 1 ). These shifts were accompanied by substantial knowledge gains (20%-22%), indicating that participants formed considered opinions on the issues under discussion. What is puzzling in these outcomes is the combination of liberal attitudes on economic policy and anti-liberal attitudes on the EU's relations with the outside world (attitudes towards otherness). Within the standard ideological geography of Europe, this is an unusual combination. The two main political families in postwar Europe have been 404 Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (4) socialism and conservatism. The former has traditionally combined support for regulated markets with cultural pluralism and cosmopolitanism; the latter has combined moderate support for unregulated and open markets with a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty. The combination, registered by these polls, between (1) growing supra-national European identity, (2) hostility to outsiders (as registered in the decreased support for enlargement), and (3) economic liberalism, is a new one on the European ideological landscape. How could we interpret this development and what are its implications for socio-cultural pluralism?
The evidence from the deliberative polls displays that, although cultural and religious differences were perceived to be relevant to enlargement (for instance, such a connection is made in many participants' statements -see Table 2 ), decreasing support for enlargement was not co-related to aversion to cultural and religious difference. Thus, agreement with the statement 'Adding a Muslim country to the EU would make the EU too diverse' decreased slightly (from 42.7% to 41.3%), and the statement 'The admittance of a Muslim country would be a problem' was mentioned 16 times while the statement 'The admittance of a Muslim country would not be a problem' was mentioned 21 times (see Table 2 ). While support for enlargement, as a proxy for attitudes towards otherness, did not acquire signification via a connection to concerns for cultural and religious pluralism, it attained connotation via a connection to socio-economic concerns related to globalization. The sequencing of the discussion of enlargement to follow the debates on socio-economic issues brought the latter into the framework of relevance within which enlargement was interpreted. As I have noted, the analysis of the data indicates a correlation between aversion to enlargement and support for globalization and neoliberal economic reforms. This shift in favor of neo-liberal economic policy is reflected in the questions in the second section of Table 1 : from those concerning job security and pensions, to free trade and economic competitiveness. In what sense could positive attitudes to economic openness be compatible with, or even entail, aversion to political openness? The element translating support for neoliberal economic policy into political support for 'closed border' policies is the economic psychology of fear that has recently started to dominate the public agenda in Europe.
Social hazards and the politics of fear
With the diminished redistributive functions of the state in recent years, access to the labor market has become a powerful factor for stratification. In a context of economic growth without job creation, as well as in the current context of jobless recovery from the recent global financial meltdown, employment is no longer an element of economic policy. It is, rather, a rare good to be distributed -a parameter of social justice. Consequently, the distribution of access to the labor market has become the major arena of social conflict. As a result, a new public agenda has appeared in recent years in response to sharpened sensitivity to economic and political risk itself linked to fears from the anticipated social impact of globalization -mainly insecurity in the maintenance of a standard of living, as well as physical unsafety. What we could refer to as the new order-and-safety agenda has four constitutive elements: physical security; political order; cultural estrangement; and income insecurity. 10 Let us note that while in the old public agenda (of the postwar welfare state) employment had been approached in terms of overall growth and efficiency, the new agenda refers to unemployment in terms of fear, loss and marginalization.
The order-and-safety agenda has fostered the spread of politics of fear of the other. We have all observed the rise of xenophobia, but also of other illiberal practices in Europe (a general call for law, safety and order), at least since the mid-1990s when electoral support for populist parties started to rise sharply. Actions such as calls to limit immigration, to ban the building of minarets, or even to increase safety measures in public spaces at the expense of privacy, all signal the emergence of a socio-cultural climate hostile to diversity, openness and experimentation, a context in which otherness is perceived negatively and is thus unwelcome.
At the root of the large range of illiberal practices we have witnessed recently is a change of the ideological landscape since the turn of the century, in other words, a change of the main lines of ideological identification and confrontation. There are two elements within this new ideological landscape 11 that are particularly relevant to our concerns today:
(1) the mainstreaming of xenophobia. Hostility to difference is no longer the exclusive domain of the extreme right; it has entered the political mainstream. Illustrations of this mainstreaming are slogans raised by parties of the center-left and the centerright, such as 'British jobs for British workers', or the drop in support for Turkey's accession to the European Union among the political leadership and the electoral constituencies of center-right parties (i.e. in Germany and France) that had initially supported it. (2) the new, economic nature of xenophobia. In contrast to the old version in which hostility to foreigners was cast in the terms of protection of cultural and political sovereignty, the foundation of xenophobia is now economic. It is related to perceived threats to socio-economic well-being (especially job loss) brought about by the open border policies of globalization. In a word, this is not a cultural, but an economic, xenophobia. Note, for instance, that 'classical' parties of the far right, such as the Front National party in France, have been adopting since the 1990s anew,hostilestancetofreeandopenmarkets.
This new type of xenophobia is ushering in a novel political era in European politics, marked by a strong aversion to socio-cultural diversity in which 'other cultures' become easy targets of social anxiety. This hostility to otherness has started to permeate the ideological family of the left as much as that of the right. As fear of job outsourcing in the context of globalization is becoming shared across the working and the middle classes, economic xenophobia has come to taint the discourse of the center-left and the centerright. 12 Most importantly, this new 'order-and-safety' agenda is eclipsing and undermining two public agendas that had been mutually empowering in the past: that of social solidarity (enabled by the redistributive functions of the state), and that of inclusive cultural diversity. Let me set out the way these two agendas had been connected in the past in order to clarify the contours of what I call 'the political economy of trust' that is quickly eroding.
The political economy of trust
A broad societal agreement on social rights had made possible the reconciliation between capitalism and democracy after the Second World War. Let us not forget that the postwar welfare state consensus on curbing economic liberalism with statemanaged redistributive policies was supported by conservative and by socialist parties. In other words, only a broad consensus between the center-left and the center-right on the value of social solidarity, as well as on the responsibility of public authority to ensure it, made possible the political economy of growth and redistribution that had been characteristic of the welfare state in Europe.
Added to this broad consensus on social solidarity was another consensus: the rise of the post-material agenda within which cultural diversity came to be celebrated in the 1970s, which was itself enabled by the political economy of the welfare state. According to Ronald Inglehart's well-known analysis, based on the World Values Survey, socialization in the context of economic affluence and security generated by the postwar welfare state led to the rise of post-material values linked to self-expression, freedom and quality of life. This resulted in the shift, since the 1970s, from the 'old politics' of bread-and-butter concerns (such as income and housing) to 'new politics' centered on lifestyle, citizen democracy, identity rights and concerns with the environment. 13 It was the success of the politics of social solidarity, and the shift it brought about from issues of material prosperity and equality to those of identity and lifestyle, that opened the cognitive space for the agenda of diversity and multiculturalism in advanced industrial democracies. This combination of public attitudes and policies (a synergy between social solidarity and multiculturalism) had been characteristic of the European welfare state as it developed in the four postwar decades. The current erosion of the social justice agenda 408 Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (4) under pressures for neo-liberal reforms might thus be said to be having an adverse effect on the multiculturalism agenda. The described change has three key parameters. First, globalization has increased the range of economic opportunity (i.e. by way of greater diversity of forms of ownership and job tenure), but at the cost of increased insecurity (e.g. for investment and job loss). Second, increased belief in the inevitable nature of (globalization-induced) economic volatility has increased concerns with governance. This correlation between unquestioning acceptance of globalization and growing concerns with governance is well captured in the EU polls data: as support for globalization, as well as allegiance to the EU have increased (see questions 4-15 in Table 1 ), concerns for governance have also risen (see question 3inTable1andquestion10inTable2).Itisthis acceptance of neo-liberal economic reforms as being without alternative, combined with apprehension about the nebulous risks that such reforms are bound to incur, that have generated the politics of fear now haunting Europe. We are confronted with the ominous novelty of anti-immigrant sentiment among the working classes, basedonfearofjoblossandsubsequentsocial fallout.
14 Consequently, the typical constituency of left parties (wage-labor) has begun lending its support to extreme right parties.Undersuchpressuresleftpartieshavethus begun engaging in economic xenophobia, as much as extreme-right parties do.
I will describe the third parameter of the change as 'individual responsibilization'. Regulatory policy in the late 20 th century has enforced individual self-reliance, as the state began using its legal authority to shift responsibility to citizens -on issues ranging from maintaining a healthy lifestyle, to protection of the environment, remaining employable, finding jobs and securing pensions. This new citizen responsibilization is captured by the EU polls, for instance, in the registered increase in declared personal responsibility for fighting climate change (driving a smaller car, paying higher prices for electricity, taking trains) to working longer. While Ulrich Beck sees such a shift in attitudes in a positive light, as a move of 'turning collective requirements into individual opportunities for choice', 15 it seems to me that individual responsibilization in the context of the economic uncertainty typical of globalization is in fact a negative development insofar as it is conducive to political and cultural conservatism, to attitudes opposed to cosmopolitanism. Autonomy that imposes an overwhelming burden of responsibility on individuals for their well-being quickly decays into what Erich Fromm called 'fear of freedom'.
In relation to this, a new alliance of social forces is being formed around a 'risk' pole of political mobilization, which rallies behind policies of economic patriotisma combination of domestic market liberalization and a closed (protected) economy, as well as cultural sovereigntism (anti-immigrant sentiment). It is the emergence of this alliance of social forces that the EU-wide deliberative polls in 2007 registered. 16 
Political responsibility and neo-liberal hegemony
Changes in economic policy that underlie the developments I have described above are commonly deemed to be caused by the inevitable impact of globalization, which increases competitive pressures on national economies. Thus, these policies have been dressed in a hegemonic discourse presenting the need to compete in the global economy, to accept cuts in social security and to face employment insecurity, as being without alternative. This naturalization of globalization (its acceptance as a natural, rather than a socially engineered, phenomenon) is well reflected by the EU polls. Note, for instance, that support for the statement 'Keeping the retirement rules the way they are will bankrupt the retirement system' rose from 48% to 62%,a sa g r e e m e n tw i t ht h es t a t e m e n t 'Increasing job security allows workers to become more skilled' decreased from 76% to 68%. However, behind the alleged objective inevitability of labor-market liberalization stand specific policies of the European Union, agreed upon by member-state governments -economic policy imposing a formula of productivity-focused jobless growth. This economic policy formula generates insecurity even as it effectively generates growth.
If there were ever doubts about the 'objective' necessity for labor-market liberalization and deregulation, commonly justified with the impending bankruptcy of public finances, these doubts were dispelled when states poured billions of public funds into the banking system during the 2008-9 global financial crises coming to the rescue of financial capital. A state intervention on such a large scale and so systemic in its nature brought to light the hegemonic nature of the discourse on the alleged incapacity of the state to finance generous social insurance and job-creation policy. It is the forced retrenchment of the welfare state, under the hegemonic discourse about the necessity for neo-liberal reforms and individual responsibilization of citizens, that has triggered the politics of fear that is tearing apart European societies. Neither national governments nor EU institutions are free of that guilt.
Conclusion
A quantitative reading of the EU deliberative polls of 2007 conveys that increased opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU is based neither on cultural nor on religious sentiment. A qualitative reading, and the analysis I have offered here, reveal that it is, instead, related to concerns with economic survival in the uncertain context of globalization. 'Closed-border' attitudes are grounded on the emerging culture of individual responsibility for economic survival which has redefined the legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens in recent years. The more individuals have to accept responsibility for their own economic well-being within a context of economic uncertainty, the more they are averse to otherness -as they see the other as a hostile competitor, rather than as a 'significant' other.
Ihavearguedthatglobalizationhasdisabledsomeofthekeycausalmechanismsthat had fostered the rise of the post-material 'new politics' of diversity, recognition and inclusion. It has eroded the politics of economic security (and not simply affluence) that had enabled positive attitudes to cultural and religious difference to emerge and consolidate in the 1960-80s. This era is now being gradually eclipsed by the return of a public agenda centered on material (economic and political) risk linked to insecurity of income and physical unsafety.
While the social question returns in the 21 st century with the threat of a rapid impoverishment of the middle classes, it is for the first time that national social justice agendas are so sharply opposed to transnational and transcultural solidarity: globalization has placed the two in a zero-sum game. The cosmopolitan concerns, typical of the new left,
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